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dc.creatorBellia, Mario
dc.creatorGirardi, Giulio
dc.creatorPanzica, Roberto
dc.creatorPelizzon, Loriana
dc.creatorPeltonen, Tuomas
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-28T09:32:19Z
dc.date.available2021-09-28T09:32:19Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-15
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2295
dc.description.abstractThis paper is a first attempt at empirically analyzing whether post-crisis regulatory reforms developed by global-standard-setting bodies have created appropriate incentives to centrally clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivative contracts. We analyze three main drivers of the decision to clear: 1) the credit risk of the counterparty; 2) the characteristics of the contract; 3) the clearing member’s net exposure vis-a-vis the Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP). We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name sovereign Credit Derivative Swap (CDS) transactions, and show that both the seller and the buyer manage counterparty’s exposures and capital costs, strategically choosing to clear when the counterparty is riskier. The riskiness of the underlying reference entity also enters the decision to clear as it affects both Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) capital charges for OTC contracts and CCP margins for cleared contracts. We empirically investigate the trade-off between the two and find that the likelihood to clear is higher if the reference entity becomes more risky, but only for the riskier sovereign CDS in the sample, while for safer sovereign CDS the opposite is true. Our findings suggest that CCP margin savings considerations may be the main force behind the decision to clear for safer instruments while CCR exposures and capital charges may prevail for riskier ones. Lastly, we find some evidence that when the transaction helps reducing counterparty’s overall outstanding positions (and therefore margins) vis-a-vis the CCP, the likelihood to clear is higher. This result holds true as long as considerations such as CCR counterparty risk and wrong-way risk do not prevail.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectSystemic Risk Lab
dc.titleThe Demand for Central Clearing: To Clear or Not to Clear, That is the Question
dc.typeWorking Paper
dcterms.referenceshttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/1400?ESRB
dc.source.filename193_SSRN-id3116261
dc.identifier.safeno193
dc.subject.keywordscredit default swap (cds)
dc.subject.keywordscentral counterparty clearing house (ccp)
dc.subject.keywordseuropean market infrastructure regulation (emir)
dc.subject.keywordssovereign
dc.subject.jelG18
dc.subject.jelG28
dc.subject.jelG32
dc.subject.topic1flat
dc.subject.topic1conduit
dc.subject.topic1basel
dc.subject.topic2disclaimer
dc.subject.topic2system
dc.subject.topic2board
dc.subject.topic3disparity
dc.subject.topic3net
dc.subject.topic3focus
dc.subject.topic1nameSystematic Risk
dc.subject.topic2nameCorporate Governance
dc.subject.topic3nameFinancial Markets
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.3116261


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