Why MREL Won't Help Much
dc.creator | Tröger, Tobias H. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-28T09:31:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-28T09:31:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01-28 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2282 | |
dc.description.abstract | The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remove the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) emanating from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficient minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. | |
dc.rights | Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | Financial Institutions | |
dc.title | Why MREL Won't Help Much | |
dc.type | Working Paper | |
dc.source.filename | 180_SSRN-id3023185 | |
dc.identifier.safeno | 180 | |
dc.subject.keywords | mrel | |
dc.subject.keywords | tlac | |
dc.subject.keywords | g-sib | |
dc.subject.keywords | bail-in | |
dc.subject.keywords | bank resolution | |
dc.subject.jel | G01 | |
dc.subject.jel | G18 | |
dc.subject.jel | G21 | |
dc.subject.jel | G28 | |
dc.subject.jel | K22 | |
dc.subject.jel | K23 | |
dc.subject.topic1 | designate | |
dc.subject.topic1 | dwindles | |
dc.subject.topic1 | instrument | |
dc.subject.topic2 | diamond | |
dc.subject.topic2 | reserve | |
dc.subject.topic2 | side | |
dc.subject.topic3 | stipulated | |
dc.subject.topic3 | brrd | |
dc.subject.topic3 | proposal | |
dc.subject.topic1name | Systematic Risk | |
dc.subject.topic2name | Stability and Regulation | |
dc.subject.topic3name | Corporate Governance | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2139/ssrn.3023185 |
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LIF-SAFE Working Papers [334]