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dc.date.accessioned2021-09-24T14:39:13Z
dc.date.available2021-09-24T14:39:13Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/1999
dc.description.abstractWe study a signaling game in which an incumbent chooses whether to disclose public spending to win re-election. In the first period he has to decide whether to introduce the transparency policy that would reduce political recents, broadly defined as extra benefits or corruption. If he introduces the policy, public spending is disclosed at the beginning of the following period. In the second period, after observing the incumbent´s policy choice, each voter casts her vote for either the incumbent or the challenger based on all available information.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.titleSurvey_MS_2012
dc.typeResearch Data
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/2012/12_19.pdf


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Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International